Keith Smith Article to be Published
Professor Keith Smith has just learned that the journal Congress and the Presidency has accepted one of his papers for publication. The article is called “Congressional Use of Authorization and Oversight.” Here is how Professor Smith describes the article:
This paper addresses two questions found in the transaction-cost literature on congressional control of the federal bureaucracy. The first question is, when does Congress seek to exercise control over federal agencies? I examine congressional use of statutory controls and oversight across different levels of public salience, technical complexity, and political conflict in executive agencies and find mixed effects for these variables on the two methods of legislative control. The second question is, are ex ante controls (i.e., constraints enacted in authorizing legislation) and ex post controls (i.e., more traditionally conceived legislative oversight activity) substitutes? While the transaction cost literature suggestion they are, I find no evidence for the substitution hypothesis across the different policy areas.
Look for it in a library near you.