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Though we publicly eviscerate politicians who engage in extramarital affairs, hire prostitutes, or send photos of their genitalia, we remained glued to the screen when such news flashes across the computer or t.v.  Former frontrunner Cain is now reconsidering whether to continue his push for the Republican party nomination after a set of damaging accusations of harassment and infidelity were revealed.  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/us/politics/herman-cain-may-quit-after-affair-and-harassment-accusations.html.

This summer, Rep. Anthony Weiner resigned his office after finally admitting he had sent photographs of his genitals to a number of women and he has been laying low since.  On the contrary, Eliot Spitzer scored a spot as a political commentator for CNN in the aftermath of his resignation from the governorship of NY — after it was revealed that he had hired the services of prostitutes illegally.

In 1998, President Clinton was impeached (though not removed), when the House found him guilty of lying under oath about an affair he had with his intern.

Does questionably moral private behavior impinge on one’s ability to conduct his or her professional office?  Can one cheat on one’s wife without necessarily “cheating” his constituents?

What do Americans think?  In other words, what is the real impact of private scandal on voter preferences for candidates?  In the minds of Americans, does character count?

Scholars have only begun to wrap their brains around the first question.  For instance, political scientists Maule and Goidel conducted an experiment to determine what variables influence reactions to a variety of political scandals (Maule and Goidel 2003).  Interestingly, the sex of the officeholder had a role in determining individual reactions to scandal, though the type of scandal and individual acceptance of gender stereotypes did as well.

But what if you’re the unfortunate politician who’s been accused of scandalous wrongdoing?  When accused of a scandal, what is the most effective political strategy an official can take?  Deny?  Confirm?  Sigal et al. (1988) experimentally tested atttitudes toward fictitious candidates who denied or apologized for either sexual or financial misconduct.  Their findings indicated that individuals were more likely to vote for the candidates who denied misconduct rather than apologized for it.

At the end of the day at the voting booth, we’ll all need to answer the normative question about whether character should count.  Regardless, the next year promises to be a scandal-filled and glorious presidential race.

Related articles

• Political Affairs Now An Open Book – NPR (npr.org)
• Cain Can’t Top NY Pols in Sexcapade Contest (newyork.ibtimes.com)
• Herman Cain Is ‘Reassessing’ His White House Bid After New Sex Scandal (businessinsider.com)
• Political Sign of Apocalypse: The Non-Denial Denial (swampland.time.com)
• Herman Cain Affair Allegations Are Irrelevant (usnews.com)

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Texas Governor and Republican presidential candidate Rick Perry has put forth a set of proposals to       uproot and overhaul Washington. Perry proposes deep reforms for all three branches of the federal government, including a constitutional amendment to put limits on Supreme Court terms and the elimination of three cabinet-level departments (and you know which three I mean).

It is Perry’s ideas about Congress that have raised the most recent attention.  He is calling for a part-time “Citizens’ Congress” whose members would hold “real jobs” in their communities. To encourage Representatives and Senators to get or hold onto real jobs he would cut congressional salaries in half.  Given the historically low congressional approval ratings (One recent poll suggested that people would like a communist takeover of the US more than they like the current Congress,) a lot of the public may think Perry’s proposal makes a good deal of sense.

Take a closer look, though.  The popular perception may be the Congress has raised the salaries of its members frequently and substantially.  The current annual salary of a member of Congress is $174,000. Not bad, but far less than a successful college football coach might make.  In fact, Congress is very reluctant to raise its members’ salaries. Imagine campaign ads, “Congressman Jones voted 8 times to raise his own salary. . . .”  Political scientist Matt Glassman points out that congressional salaries adjusted for inflation are barely higher than they were a century ago.

What may be more interesting is the finding in a recent article by Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips that more professional (meaning in part well-paid) state legislatures are more responsive to public opinion in general ideological terms and on specific policy measures. Of course, you can’t simply assume that what is true for state legislatures would automatically be true for the U.S. Congress, but it is food for thought.

Interestingly, none of Perry’s uproot and overhaul proposals apply to (drum roll) the Presidency. You might expect that weakening Congress, the courts, and the bureaucracy would tend to strengthen the White House.  Oops!

Related articles

• Perry’s Plan (nebraskaenergyobserver.wordpress.com)
• Rick Perry has ideas on how to reform government (thedaleygator.wordpress.com)
• Perry calls for government overhaul (mercurynews.com)
• Rick Perry’s Wrongheaded “Government Reform” Plan (outsidethebeltway.com)
• Perry Plan Would Make Big Changes To Washington (npr.org)
• Is Rick Perry plan to ‘uproot’ Washington enough to overcome ‘oops’ debate moment? (VIDEO) (csmonitor.com)
• Perry: Washington Needs To Be Rebuilt From The Ground Up (npr.org)
• Rick Perry wants a part-time Congress (dailykos.com)

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A monetary union without a concomitant political union is a bit like a marriage without a commitment to monogamy, and not just because both are prevalent among Europeans. The degree to which eurozone states have surrendered sovereignty  to Greater Europe is only a partial commitment. By adopting the euro, they have given up monetary sovereignty; individually,
eurozone states cannot print their own money, change their interest rates, or adjust the value of their currency. In other words, these states cannot increase their money supplies in order to stimulate short-term economic growth, they cannot lower their interest rates to spur investment or raise them to halt inflation, and they cannot devalue their currency in order to stimulate exports.

What they have given up in order to share a currency is substantial, but so are the benefits of that shared currency. Primary among them is the lowering of the transaction costs that decrease flows of goods and capital across borders. No longer does Germany trading BMWs to Italy for the latest from
Armani, Versace and Prada involve an exchange of currencies. This greatly lowers both the costs and risk of the trade. Similarly, if BMW opens a factory in Italy, it no longer needs to worry that all of its profits from sales there might be consumed by a depreciating lira (which would buy fewer deutsch marks then when the initial investment in the plant was made). Thus, both intrastate trade of goods and flows of capital in the eurozone have increased substantially since the euro was adopted at the beginning of 2001, despite falling during the recent financial crisis (see: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=133.TRD.M.I6.Y.M.TTT.I6.4.VAL
and http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp126.pdf)

But the eurozone states were not willing to jump into the deep end in their commitment to each other. They were only willing to get their feet wet to see if they liked the water (and some of them are liking it less and less of late). This was to be the first step toward a longer-term goal of a much greater commitment: political union.

Partial commitment to anything presents problems. In this case, sharing monetary and exchange rate policies without sharing fiscal (tax and spending) policies makes the success of the former more difficult. In order to join the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), wannabe member states have had to achieve the Maastricht criteria. These are a number of criteria related to exchange, inflation and interest rates, as well as government deficits and debt, which are to be kept below 3% and 60%, respectively. However, these criteria present a major commitment problem: prior to joining, states have incentives to meet the criteria, but after they have adopted the euro, there are weaker incentives for member states to continue to meet them. Thus, a number of member governments have deficits and debt levels far beyond those “allowed” by the EMU.

This really should not be a surprise. First, governments have surrendered monetary policy to the European Central Bank and, therefore, only have fiscal policy left to try to stimulate the economy during downturns. Second, there is no current method of automatically penalizing states that
violate the criteria (see: http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,724239,00.html).

The data here (http://www.ecb.int/stats/gov/html/dashboard.en.html) show that in 2010, twelve eurozone countries were over the deficit target, with Ireland at 32.4%, Greece at 10.5% and Spain and Portugal at about 9%. Twelve countries are also over the debt ceiling.

This fiscal problem, which has led to the recent debt crisis in Greece and similar problems in Portugal and Ireland (two of the major beneficiaries of eurozone membership) in recent years, is indicative of a broader problem in the European integration experiment: the fundamental tensions in trying to have monetary integration without broader political integration, especially with regards to other economic policies.

Imagine, for example, that there is an economic downturn in the United States (that should not be too difficult to do). Let’s further imagine that Michigan is hit harder by this downturn than Texas. Due to political integration among the states that comprise the USA, there will be a kind of natural shift of revenues from Texas to Michigan. Relatively more taxes will be collected in Texas and relatively more spending, on safety nets like unemployment insurance and other government programs, will be in Michigan. This is one of the advantages of the American states having joined in political union.

The need for fiscal integration in order to preserve the extent of European union so far is increasingly on the minds of leaders of both the European Union and European states (see, for example: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904265504576564801620551890.html). What is required is the further surrendering of state sovereignty to Greater Europe. In the short term, there needs to be deficit and debt level criteria with teeth (meaning a firm punishment mechanism).  But this means the inability of politicians to respond to calls by their constituents for greater spending during economic downturns, or greater social spending in general.

The benefits of union come at significant costs; however, in the long-run, Europe cannot succeed as a monetary union unless it is also committed to political union.

Related articles

• Medvedev, IMF chief discuss eurozone debt crisis (sfgate.com)
• Europe’s rescue fiasco leaves Italy defenceless (telegraph.co.uk)
• Live blog: Eurozone crisis (blogs.ft.com)
• Euro stability more important than Greece, says Angela Merkel (guardian.co.uk)
• Tough-talking Germany takes the eurozone to the brink of a break-up (telegraph.co.uk)

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Gerrymandering—the drawing of electoral districts to advantage some groups over others—is a dirty word in American politics. In this post, I want to explore some of what we know about gerrymandering and its implications for California and American politics.

Why gerrymander? The Constitution requires that representation in the House of Representatives be apportioned to states on the basis of population. As such, every ten years we count the number of people living in each state and, after making sure that each state gets one House member, divvy up the rest. Big population states like California get more House seats and smaller states get just the one. A variety of Supreme Court cases, however, have applied the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause to the process of drawing legislative districts (at all levels of government) resulting in a requirement that each district have roughly the same population. So after each Census, states and localities have to redraw their district lines to ensure that the districts are roughly equal. Given that success in a legislature depends on the number of friendly faces there, political parties and interest groups will necessarily be interested in how the lines are drawn.

How are the lines drawn? Until recently in California, the state legislature (i.e., the Assembly and the Senate) was responsible for drawing the lines defining its members’ districts and those for the House of Representatives. If the legislature couldn’t agree on a set of maps, or it couldn’t get the governor to sign off on the maps it created, then responsibility for drawing the lines went to a set of retired judges called Special Masters. At different points in time, the legislature pursued different strategies for this process. Beginning in the 1960’s, the legislature pursued a partisan gerrymander—Democrats tried to maximize the number of Democratic districts. To some extent, these efforts were thwarted by Republican governors, but the process became especially nasty following the 1990 Census.

Following the 2000 Census, everyone agreed to an incumbency protection gerrymander—regardless of an incumbent’s party, the incumbent would be made safe. Republicans would be assured of essentially the same number of seats that they currently held, as would Democrats. As a result, very few seats in the California legislature and in the California House delegation changed hands between 2002 and 2010.

So what? This process—redrawing of district lines—has been blamed for almost every problem in American and California politics. Ideologically polarized legislators? Gerrymandering did it. Budget crises? Gerrymandering did it. Overly combative parties? Gerrymandering did it. Inability pass important legislation? Gerrymandering did it. Unequal influence in the legislature? Gerrymandering did it.

The redistricting process therefore became a target for political reformers. Want to fix politics? Fix the way district lines are drawn. So in 2008, Californians enacted Prop. 11 and created the Citizens Redistricting Commission (CRC). No longer would state legislators be able to pick their own constituents. Instead, an independent commission would draw the lines for the Assembly and Senate (and Board of Equalization, though no one really cares about them). In 2010, the CRC’s mandate was expanded to include House districts as well.

Thus, over the past summer, the CRC worked to redraw California’s 177 legislative districts: 80 Assembly districts, 40 Senate districts, 53 House districts, and four Board of Equalization districts. The process, as described by Michelle DiGuilio in her recent visit to Pacific, was intensive. The CRC travelled all over the state listening to people describe their ideal districts (though notably not the legislators themselves), and then used that information to draw districts that met a variety of legal requirements (e.g., equal size, Voting Rights Act, and respecting communities of interest).

Okay, that’s a lot of information. Again, so what? So, all of this hand wringing and reform may be for naught. There is very little evidence that gerrymandering contributes at all to the problems people think it does. For example, as illustrated below, the U.S. Senate became just as polarized as the House (and at roughly the same time), even though its districts are not subject to redistricting like House districts are.

[Ed. The above image comes from Voteview.com, which presents work on measuring ideology in Congress and other legislatures.]

Similarly, within California, counties, whose lines don’t change, have become much more polarized over time. Moreover, redistricting, instead of insulating legislators from their constituents, actually increases legislative turnover and responsiveness.

So gerrymandering isn’t important? Not at all. Gerrymandering is very important, just not in the ways people tend to think about. Effective gerrymanders can have significant policy implications. In California, for example, it makes a difference whether there are 23 or 24 Republicans in the Senate. If there are 23, Republicans can’t stop Democratic efforts to raise taxes. If there are 24, Republicans can. Republican opposition to Democratic efforts to raise taxes, though, is not a result of gerrymandering. Too many people have made the latter argument.

[Ed. (11/2): Hey! It's a redistricting song: http://www.propublica.org/article/video-the-redistricting-song.]

Related articles

• California vs. the Gerrymander: Why Republicans Are Quaking (time.com)
• CA Supreme Court denies 2 redistricting challenges (sfgate.com)
• Ill. makes redistricting hall of fame (politico.com)
• California: Why Redistricting Is Worrying Republicans (time.com)

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In a recent post on the Foreign Policy site, Daniel Drezner (that’s right, the Theories of International Politics and Zombies guy) speculates about why so many Republicans have been unwilling to give the Obama administration much, if any, credit for foreign policy success.  With the demise of Muammar Gaddafi, Drezner claims, “it becomes harder and harder to argue that Barack Obama’s foreign policy is a failure.”

Drezner, a professor at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at Tufts University, wonders if Obama could turn his greater successes in foreign policy compared to other policy areas to his electoral advantage in 2012.  Here he imagines an Obama speech in which the incumbent president asks voters to consider what he could accomplish in domestic and economic policy if only he had the same room to maneuver that he has in foreign policy.

As president, I have to address both domestic policy and foreign policy. Because of the way that the commander-in-chief role has evolved, I have far fewer political constraints on foreign policy action than domestic policy action. So let’s think about this for a second. On the foreign stage, America’s standing has returned from its post-Iraq low. Al Qaeda is now a shell of its former self. Liberalizing forces are making uneven but forward progress in North Africa. Muammar Gaddafi’s regime is no longer, without one American casualty. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are winding down. Every country in the Pacific Rim without a Communist Party running things is trying to hug us closer.

Imagine what I could accomplish in domestic policy without the kind of obstructionism and filibustering that we’re seeing in Congress — which happens to be even more unpopular than I am, by the way. I’m not talking about the GOP abjectly surrendering, mind you, just doing routine things like sublecting my nominees to a floor vote in the Senate. I’ve achieved significant foreign policy successes while still cooperating with our allies in NATO and Northeast Asia. Just imagine what I could get done if the Republicans were as willing to compromise as, say, France

Drezner is resurrecting the “Two Presidencies Theory,” which was first presented in the 1960s by the legendary political scientist Aaron Wildavsky.  According to this theory, presidents have more constitutional and statutory authority to make foreign policy decisions than they do in domestic policy areas.  Other political actors, especially in Congress, may also show greater deference to the president when it comes to foreign policy.  As a result, presidents may prefer to give more time and attention to foreign policy problems than to domestic issues where they are less able to make an impact.  Some presidents, like Richard Nixon, come to office intending to concentrate on foreign policy and end up devoting even more of their presidencies to international affairs than they had intended.  Others, like Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, show little interest in foreign policy but eventually come to increase their emphasis on international affairs.

The Two Presidencies thesis has been challenged from the moment it was first proposed.  Some scholars found evidence that suggests that the theory is robustly supported.   Others have claimed the demise of the two presidencies as Congress has become less deferential in the foreign policy area.  Still others have suggested that the two presidencies theory only covers Republican presidents.  And some claim that the two presidencies phenomenon continues to persist much as Wildavsky described almost fifty years ago.

Whatever is the case about the two presidencies, it is unlikely that President Obama will be able to turn his administration’s foreign policy successes to his advantage.  To some extent, his own foreign policy successes may render foreign policy issues less salient for most voters in 2012.  Winding down the U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya will leave the state of the economy the only important question for most.

On the other hand, Republicans will not likely enjoy the built-in advantage they have enjoyed with voters about foreign-policy questions since the end of World War II.  The contenders for the Republican nomination, with the exception of Romney and Huntsman, have expressed little interest in foreign policy.  And the Grand Old Party, which has mostly spoken with one voice about foreign policy questions, is fractured among neo-conservatives, isolationists, traditional realists and whatever foreign policy point of view Herman Cain expresses.  Unfortunately for President Obama, this may not matter.  President George H.W. Bush and Senator John McCain show us that foreign policy expertise and accomplishment are unlikely to save the day when voters are focused on economic worries.

In governing, there may frequently be two presidencies.  At the ballot box, just one.

Related articles

• Obama’s Military & Foreign Policy Successes: How Did He Do It? (themoderatevoice.com)
• The Untold Story Of The Actual Obama Record, Ctd (andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com)
• Howard Kurtz Asks If Media Too Slow To Give President Obama Credit For Muammar Gaddafi Killing (mediaite.com)
• Will Foreign Policy Wins Help in 2012? (foxnews.com)
• Obama’s foreign successes may help little in 2012 (seattletimes.nwsource.com)
• Romney: Obama’s handling of foreign policy has weakened our standing in the world (hotair.com)
• Paul Joins Obama Foreign Policy Pile-On (thepage.time.com)

Last week the US Senate passed the Currency Bill, which calls for the U.S. government to impose tariff sanctions against countries that manipulate their currencies. Of course, the currency on their minds is the Chinese yuan, and probably with good reason. Over the past decade, the United States has had an enormous trade deficit with China, and last year the deficit figure was $273 billion, the largest ever (see the stats). The ever-growing imbalances between the two have persisted into this year, and the yearly deficit has now reached $290 billion.

Besides the fact that the United States itself was a “currency manipulator” when the Fed pumped $600 billion into the economy, thereby deliberately weakening the dollar (in recent years, the US dollar index has been the lowest since 1973, see the figure on the left), the Senate’s effort to solve the problem will merely risk a trade war, in which both sides exchange retaliatory measures only to hurt themselves. First, the yuan has increased by 30% in nominal terms since 2005, and yet America’s deficit with China has widened (see the figure on the right). Second, “adjustment” or “re-balancing” has already been under way, albeit at a snail’s pace, and will continue without anybody having to launch a mutually destructive trade war. Chinese unit labor costs have been growing fast at about 8.5% annually, rapidly catching up to the more well-to-do countries. This means that the rate of the yuan appreciation against the dollar in real terms has been and will be quite high, about 15% per year (see here). It also means some of the manufacturing jobs America has lost to China might come back sooner or later. Indeed, this “re-shoring” has already happened in some sectors according to the Boston Consulting Group (see here).

This doesn’t mean that the United States cannot or should not do anything in the mean time. For instance, the American solar panel industry has been severely hurt by a near overtake of the industry by Chinese competitors fed and nurtured by massive Chinese government subsidies, which may well be a violation of WTO trade law. The well-known failure of Solyndra is just one of the many victims of nearly 200 Chinese subsidy programs. The Obama administration has taken some steps to bring this issue to the WTO, the right place to go (see here). So it’s law, not war, that should govern international trade. (The irony is that to curb climate change and save the earth, probably we need to urge, rather than discourage, the Chinese government to support their clean energy development. And this is why environmentalists hate the WTO.)

Related articles

• Damn Those Stubborn American Consumers! (cafehayek.com)
• Chinese Currency Bill Won’t Spark Trade War (usnews.com)
• China to US on currency bill: I wouldn’t do that if I were you (csmonitor.com)
• China: US currency bill would have repercussions (revolutionizingawareness.com)
• China bashing not the solution ! (rightways.wordpress.com)
• China warns of trade war if U.S. bill passes (colonel6.com)
• China to US on currency bill: I wouldn’t do that if I were you – Christian Science Monitor (news.google.com)
• China says US yuan vote could set off trade war (telegraph.co.uk)
• Goldman Previews Today’s “Anti-Chinese Currency Manipulation” Bill (zerohedge.com)
• Trade Deficit with China…and What Won’t Help. (radocracy.com)

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What Robert Penn Warren and All the King’s Men

Tells us about Local Politics

Bob Benedetti

In recent years many communities have selected a book annually which citizens are encouraged to read and discuss. This year (2011) San Joaquin County selected All the King’s Men by Robert Penn Warren.  Those making the decision may have been influenced by the fact that one of two movie versions was shot in Stockton and on the Delta. Moreover, the book is arguably a great American novel and one of the few to focus on local politics. What does Penn Warren tell us about the way democracy works at the grassroots?

At first glance, the picture is not a pretty one.  All the King’s Men recounts the career of Willie Stark, a small town farmer who aspires to public life.  He takes a correspondence school route through law school and runs for local office.  He loses, but uncovers shady construction practices in the building of a local school, which later collapses.  A statewide political “machine” recruits him to run for Governor to split the rural vote.  When he realizes the stratagem, he campaigns for the machine’s opponent and, in the next election, runs against the machine and the incumbent, winning on a populist platform.  Subsequently, he uses blackmail and the promise of lucrative contracts to solidify his political position. While his policies gratify the poor, he manipulates voters with fiery rhetoric and pressures those who oppose him with all means available to him, including those of questionable legality and morality.

However, he attracts loyal followers whom the author describes sympathetically. They are torn between his attention to projects for the poor and his disregard for the standards of reasoned debate and ethical behavior.  This tension is dramatized by the interaction between Willie Stark and Adam Stanton, a young doctor from an established local family.  Stark uses one of Stanton’s friends and his sister to convince Adam to direct a new hospital.  However, when Stanton realizes that Stark has had an affair with his sister, has uncovered unsavory information about his father, and is awarding construction contracts for political gain, he shoots Stark and is killed by Stark’s bodyguard in return.

One would think that Penn Warren would settle for telling a simple morality story in which the corrupt politician gets what is coming to him for breaking the rules of fair political practice and rational policy discourse.   However, his analysis is more subtle and suggestive. He implies that Stark and Stanton are extremes between which American politics fluctuate.  He indicates that the better course of our democracy would be a balance between political realism and political idealism, between necessary compromises to get projects accomplished and the dictates of reason and conventional morality.

If we take his point and apply it to state and local politics today, we may become more sympathetic to recent governors who have seemed to be braking some promises to accomplish others.  This is not to say that Penn Warren does not see a role for principled behavior in politics.  He clearly does, but he is also aware the appeals to principle often benefit one class or group more than others.  If the public good is to be done, all classes and groups need to receive benefits.  In moderation, he would allow politicians to break eggs to make an omelet.

In sum, democracy at the grassroots is an attempt to negotiate a middle ground between the real needs of all citizens and an honoring of traditional practice and rational debate.  Penn Warren thinks it is mythic for citizens to believe that everything necessary for the polity can be accomplished by ordered deliberation.  He accepts, even dignifies, the practice of logrolling where policy is not accomplished by an agreement on merits, but by politicians mobilizing support through trading benefits across policies and, in some case, across policies and personal needs or wants.

Rational choice theory, now quite popular in political science, easily accommodates the idea of “side payments” which are conceptually akin to the practices that Penn Warren is sanctioning here.  However, such theories may not give adequate weight to the moral/rationalist/utopian strain in American democratic politics.  A more fulsome theoretic would accord equal time to the reform impulse in America, to the League of Women Voters as well as to the political machine.  All the King’s Men reminds use to look for a balance between these impulses, both empirically and normatively, as we sift through the politics running along our city streets and across our Capitol malls.

For more discussion of the book see: http://mainehumanities.org/podcast/archives/tag/all-the-kings-men

#

Related articles

• 7 best classic political novels (csmonitor.com)

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It’s has been interesting to watch the reports of the 2010 U.S. Census post. We’ve learned that poverty has become more widespread: http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html

and the Latino population has exploded:

http://temecula.patch.com/articles/hispanic-latino-chicano-population-grows-in-temecula.

That’s right, my friends – this ain’t your grandmother’s census. The U.S. Census along with the American Community Survey provide extremely reliable data on key demographic info and more. And the data collection effort has become a fantastic resource for researchers like me who need timely, reliable American data.

That said, the U.S. Census Bureau, in conducting quality-assurance tests, recently discovered an interesting spike. Read on to learn more about how the “mystery” was ultimately solved:

http://blogs.census.gov/directorsblog/2011/09/estimating-the-size-of-a-small-population.html

For those of you who find all this geeky stuff interesting, I suggest you “like” the U.S. Census on facebook. Moreover, I strongly suggest you work for the census data collection efforts in 2020. It was a tremendous learning experience for me and believe it would be for you as well!

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For several years, I have been discussing in classes the puzzle of why China has become more peaceful as it has become more powerful.  Prior to the turn of the century, China had a fairly aggressive foreign security policy, even if it was limited to territorial issues and other battles near its borders. These included preventing North Korea from losing the Korean War, a border war with India in 1962, border skirmishes with the Soviet Union in 1969, and several clashes with Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s (twice over disputed islands in the South China Sea). Then the aggression stopped.

Not only did the aggression stop, China’s foreign policy strategy in the region switched from conflict to cooperation. Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, China negotiated successfully to resolve border disputes with many of the 14 states on its border. In 2002, it signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  In 2005, China agreed with Vietnam and the Philippines to explore and develop jointly oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, despite China’s claim to nearly the entire area.

China’s extensive claim to the South China Sea means that Chinese territorial claims there clash with those of other states. Various Spratley Islands are also claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan, while the Paracel Islands are claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan.  There are known gas and oil deposits in the area that make these islands (in many cases no more than rocks big enough for a chair) more valuable than their surface area would suggest. They also provide China, which lacks air and sea power projection capabilities, a means of projecting its power beyond the mainland.

Competing South China Sea Claims

One Rock Claimed By the Philippines and China

Realist international relations theory suggests that China should be becoming more forceful in asserting its interests as its relative power rises. But that has not been the case. Liberalism would (more accurately for the recent past) predict that China, benefiting from links to the global economy and the international institutions that facilitate international exchange, would become more of a team player as its stake in the international system from which it benefits rises.  These macro-level approaches to analyzing international politics, in which the state is the unit of analysis, have their value. However, a micro-level approach that analyzes the decisions of leaders within domestic political institutions sheds more light on China’s past foreign policy behavior. Much IR theory ignores the preferences of domestic actors, and it’s these preferences and China’s political institutions that best explain China’s foreign policy behavior over the past two decades.

As Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang) policies began to be implemented in 1979, China’s foreign policy became less aggressive. Whereas Mao, when China was weaker, sought a confrontational foreign policy that would keep the revolution going, Deng and his successors have sought a peaceful international environment that would allow them to make the most of economic globalization. And make the most of it they have.

China’s economy surpassed Japan’s last year to become the second largest in the world, and recently China has become more aggressive in asserting its South China Sea claim. Chinese boats (not always Navy boats) recently confronted vessels in the area from both the United States and India, Asia’s other rising power, as well as attempting to cut cables from a Vietnamese oil exploration vessel. A realist approach predicts this more aggressive behavior and well explains the recent efforts of regional states to balance against China. But this alliance building and multilateral approach by ASEAN states in their dealings with China is not in an effort to address the balance of power in the region; it is to address  what “defensive realist” Stephen Walt calls the “balance of threat.”  The United States is still, by far, the greatest military power in the region. But Asian states, with the notable exceptions of North Korea and, perhaps, Myanmar, know that the U.S. is little threat to them.  China, however, they do perceive as a threat. Little else could explain why Vietnam would choose to engage in naval exercises with former enemy the United States.

Perhaps realism best predicts state behavior when states feel most threatened; thus, Mao balances with the United States in the early 1970s against what he perceived to be a threatening Soviet Union and Vietnam pursues closer ties to the United States as its fears of China rise. Similarly, North Korea and Iran rapidly pursue nuclear weapons after the U.S. leader declares they are part of an axis of evil and invades the third member of the axis.

Realists claim that it is relative state capabilities that bring structure to an anarchic international system.  China’s capabilities have made it the nearest rival of the United States in terms of economic output and its military should gradually close the gap with the United States over the coming decades.  China’s relative rise and the concomitant decline of the United States, should it continue, will present a grand experiment for the two major international relations theories. Realism, particularly John Mearsheimer’s brand of “offensive realism” predicts conflict between the United States and China. Liberalism, in contrast, suggests that international institutions (including multilateral bodies, but also norms) will constrain China’s behavior as it rises. Time will tell. Or, perhaps, history will show that what matters most is the decisions of political leaders based on their perception not so much of national interest in the international system but of self-interest domestically, as they seek foreign policies that will help them to maintain office.

Economic development is one pillar of legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which, of course, has no electoral legitimacy. A secondary pillar is nationalism. Using an approach that assumes political leaders wish to remain in power and that their policies reflect that aim, I predict that if China’s economy falters in the future, the CCP will put more of its weight on the nationalism pillar. In doing so they will take more aggressive foreign policy actions, particularly those that spark nationalism, such as actions supporting China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, and, if the Party’s grip on power is really threatened, moves toward Taiwan. No foreign policy action would unite the Chinese people more than an effort to retake Taiwan. While realism predicts conflict from a rising China and liberalism, cooperation, a micro-level approach suggests that leaders will do what is in their best interest politically. Sometimes that is to engage in conflict with other states; sometimes it is to cooperate with them.

Related articles

• Progress in South China Sea dispute (Australia Network News) (thuytinhvo.wordpress.com)
• While You Were in Europe: South China Sea Military Flare-up Ahead? (paul.kedrosky.com)

On the surface, Political Science appears ill-equipped for answering the question of whether you should leave your spouse if they have Alzheimer’s. After all, what do you care if x% of Americans would leave a spouse with Alzheimer’s for someone else, or if a spouse who watched x number of hours of “The Jersey Shore” had an x% increase in the likelihood of leaving his or her spouse?

Alternatively, for a more definitive empirical measurement of the problem, the following cartoon provides a clear answer to the question posed by one of Robertson’s callers: should you leave someone based on an objective measure of how much happiness that person provides you?

To many people (at least the one’s who can correctly read a line graph) the above cartoon will provide a simple solution to the dilemma of whether you should leave your spouse because your spouse has Alzheimer’s and has no idea who you are. As your happiness goes down, you should “find someone else.”

What I find intriguing about Saletan’s article is that it invites people to rethink their previously held opinions about Pat Robertson, conservatism, liberalism, their marriage bonds, adultery, and their own ethical and moral values. And it is in this capacity that Political Theory, as a subfield within political science, can provide ways of moral reasoning that might help sort through the complexity of Robertson’s response.

Consent as the Foundation of the Social (and Marital) Contract

In 2011 we take it as axiomatic that people consent to the relationships that define their lives. The social contract tradition of political theory, which includes Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and The Declaration of Independence, values the ability of people to freely choose their obligations and commitments. Commitments that people choose are legitimate. However, each of the thinkers (and document) listed above has a slightly different understanding of what consent requires of the person doing the consenting. And this is at the heart of Saletan’s article about Robertson’s comment. Consent, like the subtleties of an enduring marriage, is complicated.

On one level a marriage vow is an oath and a pledge binding two people together: a union of two separate entities into one. Marriage vows appear as a variation of the following:

Groom/Bride: I,____, take thee,_____, to my lawful wedded Wife/Husband, to have and to hold from this day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, till death us do part.

Bride/Groom: I,_____, take thee,_____, to my lawful wedded Husband/Wife, to have and to hold from this day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love, cherish, and to obey, till death us do part.

While egalitarian sensibilities often lead couples to delete the “to obey” from the second passage, few couples delete the passage “in sickness and in health.” If you consent to marriage, then you have pledged to “hold from this day forward . . . in sickness and in health” to love and cherish the person you married.

So what does “in sickness and in health” mean to different people? And how might two people come to a common understanding of what “in sickness and in health” means? When is a spouse no longer a spouse? Or, alternatively, when have the obligations of matrimony been violated to the point where one spouse is justified in leaving another? And here is the larger political question: when do the obligations to others outweigh the claims to one’s own happiness? Political theory tries to answer such questions through discussion of justice, virtue, and whether there is a duty to care between people who are spouses, friends, and even strangers.

Questions for you to think about:

1. As you read the Saletan’s article ask yourself what you would do?
2. What kind of information or knowledge would help you make the decision Robertson’s caller is trying to make?
   1. How does your education, particularly in political science, help you morally reason through this question?
3. Or, if your college education has no business in trying to educate someone about how to handle the situation Robertson’s caller describes, who—if anyone—should educate people about their duties and obligations?
   1. Should we even bother with such questions in a political science class?
4. Does the state have a duty to protect the spouse with Alzheimer’s from financial abuse by the other spouse?
   1. Does the state have a duty to protect the spouse without Alzheimer’s from financial, or physical abuse from the spouse with Alzheimer’s?
5. Finally, since you have been asked to comment on this blog post by Professor Klunk, I would ask that you read some of the commentsposed on slate.com about Saletan’s article, and then think about the following questions:
   1. How would your comments differ if your posts about this article were 1) anonymous,  2) if your name, picture and home address were attached to your comments, 3) you had to read your comments face to face to your classmates?

Related articles

• Pat Robertson: Divorce Is Bad, Unless Your Spouse Has Alzheimer’s (onebluestocking.wordpress.com)
• Pat Robertson: It’s Okay To Divorce If Your Spouse Gets Alzheimer’s [Moral Minority] (jezebel.com)
• Pat Robertson: Divorcing Alzheimer’s-Afflicted Spouse Okay (fellowshipofminds.wordpress.com)
• Pat Robertson Says Alzheimer’s Is Grounds For Divorce (VIDEO) (kaystreet.wordpress.com)
• Divorce on grounds of Alzheimer’s (geneveith.com)
• Pat Robertson says Alzheimer’s makes divorce OK (but gay marriage is still wrong) (queerlandia.com)
• Pat Robertson – In Sickness And In Health, Unless The Sickness Is Alzheimers (mgpcpastor.wordpress.com)
• Another reason why Pat Robertson is out to lunch (onthebema.com)
• Pat Robertson on Alzheimer’s (localpaper.wordpress.com)
• Is Alzheimer’s Disease a Walking Death? (psychologytoday.com)