Prop. 14 and California’s Minor Parties

So after not posting anything new for a while, you get a couple posts one right after the other.

My article, “Proposition 14 and California’s Minor Parties: A Case Study of Electoral Reform and Party Response,” is now available from the California Journal of Politics and Policy here (gated unfortunately; here’s the version I will be presenting at MPSA next month). Here’s the abstract:

In 2010, California voters enacted Proposition 14, the Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act, which changed California’s electoral system from single-member, plurality district elections to a top two (majority) runoff system. Although literature in comparative politics and formal theory suggests this change should help third parties in California, almost 80% fewer minor-party candidates filed for office in 2012 than in 2010. Indeed, 2012 saw the smallest number of minor-party candidates in California since 1966. Employing a mixed-methods approach, this paper examines different explanations for the decline in minor-party candidacies. Although most observers argue that Proposition 14 directly discouraged minor-party candidates from filing for office (because they likely would not make the runoff ballot), I argue that the decline results from three other factors: (1) a long-run decline in the California Libertarian Party, (2) a legislature-driven increase in the filing fee required from minor-party candidates, and, most importantly, (3) party elites foregoing candidate recruitment in 2012.

If their publishing schedule looks like last year’s, it will be in the upcoming June issue.

The Future of California Politics?

The California Department of Finance released its new population projections for California counties through 2060. There are a whole bunch of goodies in the report, so I thought I would highlight a few of them here.

First, by 2050, Hispanics are projected to be the plurality ethnicity in California. Here’s the projected ethnic makeup (see p. 6) of California in 2010 and 2060:

By 2060, Hispanics will make up 48% of the population (up from 38%), Whites will be 30% of the population (down from 40%), Asian and Pacific Islanders will be 13% (same), African Americans will be 4% (down from 6%), and everyone else will be 5% of the population.

In terms of future voters, these changes have potentially significant implications for California politics. I am not one of the people who thinks that “demographics are destiny” in terms of party politics, at least over the long run, so I don’t think these changes mean that the Republican Party is looking at long term irrelevance in California. If the party keeps its current platform, sure, but there is no reason it has to. Both parties, though, are going to have to adapt to the changing electorate as the issue sets of Hispanic voters are different than the issue sets of white voters.

Second, California will remain relatively young relative to the rest of the country. Our economy (and our budget) will not be as heavily impacted by the Baby Boomers and Generation X moving into retirement. There will still be significant demand, and resources, for public education. The aging of the population will not be uniformly distributed across ethnicities, which will also have significant implications for politics. Whites will grow older faster than any other ethnic group. By 2030, there will be more whites over the age of 65 than under the age of 25 in California. In contrast, there will by almost three times as many Hispanics under the age of 25 as there are Hispanics over the age of 65.

Third, the population–and therefore power–will continue to move inland. Southern California (particularly Los Angeles County) will remain the 800-pound gorilla in California politics, but the Central Valley (Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys) and the Inland Empire (San Bernardino and Riverside) will see their relative populations grow with the rest of the state seeing their relative populations decline. The Central Valley will see its relative population grow 27% between 2010 and 2060. The Inland Empire will see relative growth of 28%. The Bay Area, in contrast, is projected to see the steepest decline in its relative population (down 10%). These changes mean that over time the Central Valley and Inland Empire will gain representatives in Sacramento and Washington DC while other areas see their representation decine.

Fourth, San Joaquin County will more than double in size between 2010 and 2060. San Joaquin will go from being the 15th largest county in California (with just under 700,000 residents) to the 12th largest county (with over 1.5 million residents). Hispanics will account for more than half of this growth.

 

Vote by Mail and Election Results

An emerging theme from the 2012 elections is the impact of vote by mail (VBM) and other convenience voting reforms, such as provisional ballots, on the speed with which we know the results. John Wildermouth, for example, argued yesterday that the prevalence of n0-fault, permanent VBM and early voting in California means that it’s taking longer than it should to know who won on November 6. He writes:

It’s taking longer and longer to get a final count of a statewide election and the problem only is going to get worse.

The growing number of vote-by-mail ballots turned in at the polls, combined with more and more provisional ballots that need to be hand-checked, means that election night is becoming election week. Or election month.

The relationship between the use of VBM and other convenience voting reforms and the speed with which we know the results of an election is an interesting question, but it is one that we do not have a lot of data on at this point.

As the following graph shows, voters in California’s counties vary in their use of VBM. The graph shows the percentage of voters casting their ballot through the mail in the June 2012 election. I did a quick and dirty analysis exploiting this variation to see if there is a relationship between the prevalence of VBM in a county and whether or not we know its results by now. If greater VBM usage leads to less certainty about the election outcomes, then counties at the top of the chart should be done with their counts while counties at the bottom should still be counting. The analysis calls into question this emerging theme.

There are two dependent variables for the analysis: First, has a county sent in its county canvass complete (CCC) numbers to the state, thereby signaling it has counted all its ballots? Second, and conversely, has a county still just reported its final election night update (FENU)? The data for county reporting status come from here. Since these are binary outcomes (yes or no), logistic regression is appropriate here.

I use three independent variables in each model: (1) The percentage of VBM ballots in a county in the June 2012 election, (2) the total number of registered voters in a county, and (3) the total number of ballots cast in the county. I use the prevalence of VBM in a county from the June election as the numbers are not yet available for the November election. VBM usage is generally higher in the June election, however, so it should give us a good idea of how many people were likely to use VBM.

The results (shown in Table 1) are suggestive of a relationship but not encouraging for the VBM causes delay hypothesis. The coefficient for the percentage of voters using VBM in the CCC status model is -0.052 with a z of -0.97 (p=0.334). While the estimated effect is negative, meaning that the greater the percentage of VBM ballots the less likely it is a county will have moved to CCC status, given the z-score we cannot conclude that the results is due to anything other than random chance. The coefficient for the percent VBM in the FENU model is 0.023 with a z of 0.89 (p=0.373). Again, the estimated effect is in the right direction–greater VBM usage leads to a higher likelihood of a county still being in FENU status–but the z-score is too small to let us conclude the relationship is real. Substantively the signs are in the right direction, but statistically we can’t say there is a relationship on the basis of these results.

Caveats: (1) The data are for this year only. There may a change due to VBM over time. (2) The data are for California only. There may be differences due to VBM across states. (3) The data are only to date. There may be differences due to VBM that emerge once all of the counties have reported their final counts.

So, How Did the Minor Party and No Preference Candidates Do?

One consequence of Proposition 14 is that there were almost no legislative contests this year featuring minor-party candidates. As I previously argued, Proposition 14 combined with the legislature’s increase in filing fees essentially ended the idea of a third-party candidacy in California. As a result, just three minor-party candidates (all from the Peace and Freedom Party) and five No Party Preference (NPP) candidates appeared on the November ballot.

How did these eight candidates do against their major-party opposition? With two notable exceptions (discussed below), they performed as well as past candidates in similar situations– i.e., not well at all. Over the last five election cycles, there have been 31 contests where a major-party candidate (Democratic or Republican) faced just one independent or minor-party candidate. In every case, the major-party candidate won, usually by a lot. The following table shows the average vote share for the major-party candidate in these contests:

The average vote share for major-party candidates was a little lower in 2012 than in prior years. Whereas the average winning vote share was about 80% previously, in 2012 these candidates still averaged just 75% of the vote across the eight contests.

The following figure shows the average vote share for each of these 31 candidates by election cycle. The large standard deviations for 2008 and 2012 in Table 1 are the result of three contests, all against independent or NPP candidates. In 2008, Abel Maldonado (R), who was instrumental in giving California Proposition 14, faced a strong independent challenger, Jim Fitzgerald. Maldonado won with 63% of the vote. This year, Henry Waxman (D) beat Bill Bloomfield (NPP) with just 53% of the vote. Also in 2012, incumbent Democratic Assemblyman James Paul Fong beat Chad Walsh (NPP) with 62% of the vote. Pull these three contests out, and 2008 and 2012 look just like 2006 in Table 1.

So, to sum up. Did independents (NPP) and minor-party candidates do any better under the top two system than under California’s previous system? Not really. The Fong and Waxman contests are worth some additional exploration in this regard, but even with these contests the major party candidates won by quite a lot on average.

Update [11/16]: The above graph doesn’t appropriately convey the futility of candidates running against otherwise unopposed major-party candidates. Here’s another take:

More on McNerney v. Gill

In a previous post, I argued that Ricky Gill’s campaign made a strategic error in defining him as the San Joaquin candidate. (Here’s what I mean by that.) The argument got some blowback from Gill’s campaign consultant in the comments and Mike Fitzgerald at the Record. Since, admittedly, I oversold the argument in my first post I want to provide some context and elaborate on it a little more here.

It was always going to be hard for Ricky Gill to win his contest against Jerry McNerney. There were three primary strategic challenges facing Gill at the start of the contest:

1) Jerry McNerney was the incumbent. The maps below show McNerney’s old district (CD-11) and his new district (CD-9). Although the two differ in important ways, including the fact that McNerney’s old residence is not in CD-9, most of the new district overlaps the old one. Most voters in the new CD-9 previously saw McNerney’s name on their ballots.

McNerney’s old district, CD-11

McNerney’s new district (CD-9)

The Vanishing California Republican Party?

Buckle up California. The state Republican Party is flirting with complete irrelevancy this election. If the current returns hold, Democrats will control 2/3 of both the State Senate and the State Assembly, giving them complete freedom in Sacramento. The one lever that the Republican Party has held in California politics–especially after Prop. 25 (2010) lowered the threshold for passing a budget to a simple majority–is that a 2/3 vote is required to raise revenue. They may not have that lever any more.

There are 40 State Senators, and 27 votes (2/3*40=26.8) are required to pass a revenue increase. The Democrats already control 14 seats, and appear to be winning 14 more. There are no close contests here. Democrats should have the 2/3 supermajority required in the State Senate.

There are 80 Assembly members, and 54 votes (2/3*80=53.6) are required to pass a revenue increase. The Democrats appear to have won 54 seats. The two closest contests are AD-65 (Anaheim), where Sharon Quirk-Silva (D) leads Chris Norby (R) by just 1,004 votes, and AD-32 (Hanford), where Rudy Salas (D) leads Pedro Rios (R) by an even more minuscule 268 votes. Expect some lawsuits over the recount here, because right now 268 votes are all that stand between Republican relevance and Republican irrelevance.

Of course, all these numbers are provisional. That said, if the results hold after the various recounts, the Republican minority won’t even need to bother to show up in Sacramento. The Democrats won’t need them to do anything.

Update [11/8 at 5:00 PM]: Both Salas and Quirk Silva still lead. Salas’s margin is still at 268 votes. Quirk-Silva’s has gone up to 1,043 (up 39).

Update [11/13 at 11:30 AM]: Salas is now way ahead, having built a 2,500 vote lead. Given the low number of votes in the district, the difference is enough to move it off the Secretary of State’s “close contest” list. Quirk-Silva’s lead is now the smallest (at least in those contests where a Democrat is facing a Republican) at a little more than 2,200 votes.

More on Jerry McNerney’s Big Win

For all his strength as a fundraiser ($2.6 million as of Oct. 17; $5.6 million with outside money added in) and his admirable qualities as a candidate, Ricky Gill did slightly worse than either of Jerry McNerney’s other recent challengers. In 2008, Dean Andal received 45% of the vote. In 2010, David Harmer received 47% of the vote. Ricky Gill got just 44% of the vote.

Why did Ricky Gill do so poorly, especially since he was a much better candidate than either Andal or Harmer? While Gill is ideologically out of step with the district (far more conservative), I don’t think that’s the explanation. Gill and his campaign did a good job dissembling on that fact and emphasizing those dimensions and issues that cast Gill in a positive light.

I think the story is Gill’s strategic choice to cast himself as the “San Joaquin” candidate. Boiled down to its essence, Gill’s campaign message was, “I am from San Joaquin; my opponent is not.” Gill emphasized his ties to Lodi and the local agriculture community. There are two (three) problems with this message as far as CD-9 is concerned:

First, while agriculture is an important part of the San Joaquin economy, it’s not the whole of the economy. There are a lot of other economic interests–especially the Port of Stockton–that are important. Gill essentially wrote those off in his campaign.

Second, and relatedly, a lot of the district is outside San Joaquin County. About 30 percent of the district lives in Contra Costa County–outside the valley that Gill so emphasized in his campaign–and Contra Costa went heavily for McNerney (59-41). Contra Costa supplied over 70 percent of McNerney’s margin of victory over Gill. Again, Gill wrote off a large portion of the electorate with his primary campaign message.

Update 2: Given McNerney’s advantage in Contra Costa County, and assuming the same level of turnout in San Joaquin, Gill needed to win at least 54.5% of the San Joaquin vote. He didn’t come close to that.

The third problem for Gill–not related to the strategic choice his campaign made–was that he is a Republican running in a Democratic district at a time when party labels are very important to voters. San Joaquin County voted 53-44 for President Obama. It voted 52-48 for McNerney. In that regard, Gill did well. Ultimately, when combined with the strategic miscalculation, though, it proved fatal.

Edit/Update 1: In the background is also the fact that Jerry McNerney ran a very effective, low-key, and workman-like campaign that did all the things it was supposed to do. It registered voters. It targeted its appeals well. It used valence issues (Gill is too young and inexperienced) effectively. These are important contributors to this election’s outcome. I think the main story given Gill’s strengths, however, is that Gill made a major strategic mistake and it cost him important votes.

Update 3: See here for some more thoughts.

Obligatory “What Does It All Mean” Post

I don’t think the election changed much or told us anything we didn’t already know about American politics. It was pretty much a status quo election. Sorry to disappoint. Here’s some collected thoughts instead.

National

Evidence-based claims generally win out over faith-based claims. The poll-driven election forecast models (e.g., Pollster, 538) were right. “Vibrations” and claims that the polls just seemed wrong were not. Also, Dick Morris still doesn’t have a clue. At least he’s good for a laugh.

It’s hard to beat an incumbent president when things are getting better. Also, when the primary point of comparison is still George W. Bush.

The basic dynamics of national politics haven’t changed. It will still be hard for President Obama to get what he wants from Congress. Republican policy preferences, and the intensity with which they are held, haven’t changed.

The House Florida crazy quotient changed sides of the aisle. West lost. Grayson won.

California

Holding schools hostage works. Prop. 30 passed.

California voters still like to be tough on crime. Prop. 35 won and Prop. 34 lost.

Voters can read. Prop. 40 passed by a wide margin.

Local

It’s hard to win if you are mayor when the city declares bankruptcy. Mayor Johnston lost.

That said, it’s possible to win even if you voted for the bankruptcy. Eggman won.

Basing your entire campaign on “being from here” (San Joaquin) is great so long as (1) a significant portion of the district isn’t somewhere other than “here,” (2) you aren’t running against an incumbent, and (3) the district isn’t titled toward the other party. McNerney–outspent nearly two to one–beat the upstart Gill by a healthy, seven eight-point margin (53.5-46.5 54-46). Contra Costa County, about 30% of the district, went heavily (58-42 59-41) for McNerney. San Joaquin voted 52-48 for McNerney, slightly less than it voted for President Obama.

Fun with CD-9 Registration Statistics

The California Secretary of State released the 15-day (before the election) registration statistics today. Here’s how things stack up in CD-9:

Democrats now have a 12-point registration advantage in the district.

• On Sept. 7 (60 days before the election), Democrats only had a 10-point registration advantage (45% to 35%). On May 21, the Democrats only had an 8-point advantage (44% to 36%).
• There are 313,105 people registered to vote in CD-9. 46% are registered as Democratic, 34% are registered as Republican, 16% are registered no party preference, and 4% are registered with a minor party.

Most of the district’s voters live in San Joaquin County.

• 67% of the registrants live in San Joaquin. 29% live in Contra Costa County, and 4% live in Sacramento County.

Democrats won the registration battle.

• The biggest change is in San Joaquin County, where the Democratic registration advantage has gone from 6 points (44% v. 38% on Sept. 7) to 9 points (46% v. 37% on Oct. 22).
• Between Sept. 7 and Oct. 22, 19,557 more people registered to vote. Of those, 61% registered Democratic (11,986) compared to just 15% who registered Republican (2,863).

McNerney and Gill’s Ideological Positions

Using publicly available data from Project Vote Smart–which itself uses publicly available candidate statements and positions–Boris Shor of the University of Chicago has created point estimates for the ideologies of all of the congressional candidates running in 2012. (You can find an explanation of the methodology as well as the full ideological distributions for each party here.)

As I have noted several times, both Jerry McNerney and Ricky Gill have made it difficult to pin their ideological positions down. McNerney is a little easier because he is a sitting member of Congress, and therefore we have voting data w e can use to figure out where he lies on the ideological spectrum. Ricky Gill, however, has intentionally dissembled at every opportunity.

In my classes and in previous posts, I have argued the it is hard to pin down McNerney because he really is a moderate. If you think about all of the Democrats in California, he is to the right of (more conservative than) almost all of them. Gill, on the other hand, is ideologically very conservative and he’s hiding [edit: downplaying] that fact in order to win election in a center-left district. In fact, by Shor’s estimates, he is to the right of the most other California Republicans. Here’s the evidence:

The 9th congressional district leans slightly Democratic. So if Gill wins–which he might–we will be replacing an someone who is center-left ideologically with someone who is on the extreme right.

Update: By Shor’s data, Gill is more conservative than 68% of all the Republican House candidates in 2012. McNerney is more liberal than just 36% of the Democratic House candidates.

Update 2: For those too lazy to click over to Shor’s site–and you really should, it’s fantastic–here’s McNerney and Gill plotted against all of the House candidates in 2012.