One final note about Pacific Political Scientists at the American Political Science Association (APSA) meetings in Seattle:
Congratulations to Professor Dari Sylvester, who received the 2011 Adaljiza Sosa-Ridell Award for Exemplary Mentoring of Latino/a Students in Political Science. The Adaljiza Sosa-Ridell Award is presented each year by the APSA’s Committee on the Status of Latinos and Latinas in the Profession.
University of the Pacific Political Science and International Studies Professor Daniel O’Neill also participated in the recent Seattle meetings of the American Political Science Association. He delivered a paper “Risky Business: China‘s Foreign Direct Investment and Aid to Developing Countries.”
Here’s the abstract for the paper:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from China is increasingly destined for developing states with high corruption, weak rule of law and substantial political risk. To explain the ability of China’s state owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest successfully in such environments, I present a theory of how Chinese bilateral policies, particularly foreign aid, shape incentives for the leadership in the receiving country that constrain predatory behavior against Chinese SOEs. This creates a de facto insurance for Chinese investors in foreign states lacking the institutions shown to protect investments. Case studies of Chinese SOEs in Cambodia and Kazakhstan support the hypotheses. A main contribution of this study is in analyzing the effects of the policies of home (FDI source) country governments on outward foreign direct investment.
- Growth in foreign investment in China slows (seattletimes.nwsource.com)
At the recent meeting of the American Political Science Association, Pacific‘s Professor Yong Kyun Kim presented a poster “Who Builds Up Foreign Debt and Who Brings It Down?” His student attributes a great deal of change in foreign debt to political institutions. Here is his abstract:
We present an empirical analysis of the political determinants of foreign-debt buildup and reduction in developing countries. Three interesting patterns stand out. First, most factors exhibit nonlinearity when the dependent variable’s sign changes. Federalism, for instance, helps prevent a large debt buildup but does not promote a large debt reduction. Second, some factors are symmetric in the sense that they accelerate or dampen changes in both directions. Presidential systems are associated with a signiﬁcant rise in foreign debt as well as with its big fall. Finally, the way many political institutions are related to changes in foreign debt differs signiﬁcantly across different levels of democracy. Governments with a larger share of seats in the legislature and left governments are better able to bring their foreign debt down only if they are highly democratic. When highly autocratic, they make it less likely to happen. We show that political institutions as a whole explain a great deal of variation in the increase and decrease of foreign debt and that they do so in a complex manner.
You can see Professor Kim’s poster here: ykimapsa2011.